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The democratization process in Georgia, starting with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and declaring independence in 1991, has come through the rocky 
terrain, with ups and downs, struggling with the internal (nationalism, ethnic 
fragmentation, state weakness and fragility, weak party-politics) and external 
(Russia’s grip on the Near Abroad, hence on Georgia in the geopolitically strategic 
region of the South Caucasus, intersection of the great powers’ interests and proxy 
clashes in the region in general and in Georgia in particular) challenges. This paper 
claims that the challenges of democratization process in Georgia should be 
highlighted at the intersection of external and internal threats; hence the widely 
acclaimed visions of triple (see: Offe, 2004) and quadruple (see: Kuzio, 2001) models 
of transformation describing the processes of democratization under state-building 
and nation-building processes should be pinned down to the analysis of causes of 
fragmentation of [political] public sphere in order to uncover intersections of the 
internal and external threats to democracy, which have undermined the process of 
democratization and unleashed the trends of populism and illiberalism.  
The internal and external rivals of democratization have been rotating in the 
political landscape of Georgia, whose influence could be highlighted through the 
concept of [fragmentation] of political public sphere (see: Habermas, 1992). This 
necessitates to look at the modernization - democratization nexus in the context of the 
rise of populist and illiberal forces (political parties, NGOs, CSOs) of different kinds 
in the Georgian socio-political setting, which challenge the pro-European foreign 
policy course, hence normative trigger of democratization in Georgia. The reflection 
on challenges of democratization is offered through deconstruction of the processes 
of state-building and nation-building not in terms of success and/or failure of 
governmental policies in these spheres, but through the scope of securitization, 
juxtaposing external security vs. domestic security issues, which influence the 
behavior of the local actors (political elites), therefore on the nature of domestic 
regime. 
The post-Soviet Georgian politics is a mixture of populism (policy-making 
tool) and nationalism (ideology), whereas discursive exploration of the political 
 
1This research was supported by the fellowship of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
(Moldova) Program "Strengthening Research Capacities of Junior Professionals and Experts 
in the Eastern Partnership Region (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine)", 2020. 
2 
 
context, political process and the political system differentiates symbolic politics, 
social cognition, symbols and forms of speech and text and legitimization practices 
through media and public opinion management, which gives politicians access to 
control public discourse – i.e. partial control over public mind. The emergence of 
post-Soviet populist discourses in Georgia coincided with the period of what is termed 
in the literature on transitology as the triple transition: simultaneous changes in the 
spheres of politics (from the totalitarian experience to democracy), economy (the 
Soviet-style planned economy to the market capitalism) and wider societal sphere 
(state – state-building, institutional engineering, identity politics, etc.), which was 
characteristic feature of the post-socialist transitions, primarily that of the CEE region 
(see: Offe, 2004). The cases of the post-Soviet states’ transformation (including in 
Georgia) necessitate to include the fourth element, which comes under the label 
quadruple transition, incorporating nation as well, in addition to democracy, market 
and state, and not subsuming nation and state under one category (Kuzio, 2001, 174). 
Exactly the nation was made as the central element of the populist discourses of each 
president of Georgia, which emerged through the competitive public political 
narratives, created in the context of changing social and political reality and 
transformed into political actors’ temporally and spatially defined narratives, 
containing the main messages of the time for manipulation of national political 
discourses. The exclusive metanarratives, concentrated on various kind of ethnic or 
civic nationalism, plundered the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and destabilized socio-
political setting in Georgia (particularly at the time of transfer of power from one 
government to the other) as the “national mythmaking is the attempt to use dubious 
arguments to mobilize support for nationalist doctrines or to discredit opponents and 
the product of deliberate elite efforts to mobilize latent solidarities behind a particular 
political program” (Snyder and Ballentine, 1996, 66). 
The three aspects are necessary for understanding the (trans)formation of 
internal and external challenges to democratization in Georgia: ongoing social 
changes, pre-existing ethno-symbolic resources and new ideological movement 
(arguably nationalism and its mixture with populism) born out of the former two in 
the period of transition. These three features of the Georgian political landscape 
provide foundations for the politically motivated narratives, connecting particular 
developments in a way to impose desired order via setting causal links between 
selected events and planned political discourse. The public sphere at large became a 
site for ‘contest and negotiation between varieties of publics’ (Dayan, 2001, p. 760), 
which possess an (internal) sociability and an (external) performance, hence internal 
and external challenges to democratization. This performance consists of taking up a 
public position, with reference to an agenda (Ibid, p. 756), which influences on the 
policy making process.  
The research employs methods of qualitative analysis of primary and secondary 
sources and refers to the discourse-historical approach. The discourse-historical 
approach is a relevant method as it is a “systemic collection and analysis of that 
information, which is related to particular past events and enables to explain present 
developments for prediction of the future” (Connaway and Powell, 2010, p. 79); 
Methodologically it juxtaposes transformative positions of political actors on the one 
hand and tools and strategies of Kremlin’s dis-information incursion on the other 
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hand. Theoretically paper refers to Jürgen Habermas’s elaborations on public sphere 
and to the concept of political public sphere in particular.  
The concepts – public sphere, disinformation/misinformation and propaganda 
– describe the Russian information incursion abroad which influences on the process 
of democratization in Georgia: public sphere is defined as “a realm of social life in 
which something approaching public opinion can be formed, whereas political public 
sphere refers to the case when public discussion deals with objects connected to the 
activity of state (Habermas et al, 1974, p.49). The disinformation incursion is defined 
as the dissemination of deliberately false information, especially when supplied by a 
government or its agent to a foreign power or to the media, with the intention to 
influence the policies or opinions of those who receive it. The term disinformation 
should not be confused with misinformation, defined as information which is wrong 
or misleading, but not deliberately so. The both concepts could be considered under 
manipulation of information and connected to propaganda, which is a systematic 
dissemination of information, especially in a biased or misleading way, in order to 
promote a particular political cause or point of view. 
The first part of the paper discusses the factors which contribute to the 
fragmentation of the political public sphere in Georgia, hence undermining 
democracy. Then it uncovers prospects of democracy promotion vs. securitization of 
foreign policy, as the latter significantly influences on the democratization process. 
The consecutive two sections bring the analysis of the internal and external challenges 
of democratization. The concluding part summarizes the main findings of challenges 
and prospects of the democratization process in Georgia at present stage. 
 
Fragmentation of the [Political] Public Sphere & Undermining Democracy 
The current section uncovers those aspects which are manipulated by the pro-
Russian media outlets in Georgia for undermining the democracy and 
democratization process in the country. Overall, this process leads to the 
fragmentation of the political public sphere in which the pro-Western discourse and 
foreign policy course is marginalized, and even compromised at some point, by the 
government of Georgia in favour of the pro-Russian incline. This leads to the 
contradictions between the pro-Western and pro-Russian foreign policy courses.  
The populist rhetoric of the presidents of Georgia concentrated on different 
aspects of transition mentioned above: each president overwhelmingly focused on 
politics, but Zviad Gamsakhurdia failed his project as it was directed by ethnic 
nationalism, performing miserably in economy and failing in cultural policies 
necessary for the multi-ethnic country. Eduard Shevardnadze succeeded in domestic 
and foreign policies in terms of stabilization, directing the former according to the 
principles of civic nationalism and the latter according to geopolitics, but failed in 
building and sustainable development of the robust state institutions, which were 
significantly harmed by the mass corruption during his presidency. Mikheil 
Saakashvili, in his ambitious program of state-building and nation-building, 
succeeded in the former, primarily due to reinforcement of state institutions, and 
partly in the latter with non-secessionist minority regions; whereas with conflicting 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Saakashvili found himself and the country 
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in the major trouble – the Russian-Georgian August War of 2008. The duality of 
power between president Giorgi Margvelashvili and PM (Bidzina Ivanishvili and his 
successors) bifurcated the populist discourse in Georgia as long as the former 
concentrated on reinforcement of the constitutional backbone of the state, whereas the 
latter shifted to the leftist-populism: both of them actually failed, but the latter 
discourse survived due to a strong socio-political capital of Ivanishvili (the role of 
personality in the Georgian politics should be taken into account as well). Finally, it 
is hard to make similar predictions for the current president Salome Zourabishvili due 
to the following factors: firstly, like Margvelashvili, she is also a hand-picked by 
Ivanishvili, although she enjoys even more restricted presidential power via new 
regulations introduced to the constitution by the parliament during the presidency of 
Margvelashvili (constitutional amendments introduced in 2017 with the aim to make 
necessary adjustments for the parliamentary republic) which came into effect with the 
election of the new president – Salome Zourabishvili in 2018.  Without risky moves 
so far, it is hard to predict what will be internal and external policies of Zourabishvili, 
primarily in the context of relations with the ex-PM and still influential person in the 
Georgian politics – Bidzina Ivanishvili. 
Since declaration of its independence on April 9, 1991, the Georgian political 
landscape has been the battle ground between the pro-Western and pro-Russian 
political forces, which fragmented [political] public sphere. The pro-Russian camp 
promotes the idea of orthodox unity, portraying Russia as the key to restoration of 
country’s territorial integrity. The pro-Western camp, referring to negative past 
experience of Georgia’s relations with the Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, 
considers the Euro-Atlantic integration as a security guarantee of Georgia and a 
precondition of its return into the European family from cultural and political point 
of view. The Russian funded or proxy media outlets and the Russian orientated or the 
Russian-backed NGOs/CSOs in Georgia spread disinformation, manipulate public 
opinion, discredit the pro-Western political forces and undermine the pro-Western 
discourse through their rhetoric, which resonates with the Russian dis-information 
messages. The soft-power policy of the EU (hence normative trigger of 
democratization process) becomes gradually undermined through collision of 
historical-religious (Russian Orthodoxy) and cultural-value (liberal conception of the 
West) driven agendas in Georgia. Georgia is particularly vulnerable to this tendency 
as population is bifurcated across the identity and value axis and even split between 
the liberal-democratic model (the Russian propaganda systematically focuses on the 
themes as moral decay of Europe and the impeding collapse of the West, fragility of 
liberal democracy, equating liberalism to the LGBT rights’ promotion, thus being 
unacceptable for the historically traditional population of Georgia) and the Orthodox-
Christianity (Russia, being the leader of this camp, presented as the defender of 
conservative, Orthodox and traditional values vis-à-vis liberal, degraded and 
hedonistic West) (Polyakova, 2016A), which leaves ample avenues for the emergence 
and activation of the populist and illiberal forces of different kinds. 
The narratives disseminated by the Russian media contributed to the falsehood 
– provided merely as ‘alternative facts’ – which could be termed as a ‘post-truth’ 
culture, making foreign disinformation campaign more likely to erode the very 
foundations of enlightened debate, on which liberal democracies depend (MSC 
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Report, 2017, 8). The political public sphere became characterized with two cross-
cutting processes: the communicative generation of legitimate power and the 
manipulative deployment of media power to procure mass loyalty (Habermas, 1992, 
p. 752). Moreover, the Russian disinformation does not directly intervene in the local 
setting for dissemination of propaganda and the Kremlin’s political aims, rather it 
coordinates with the national online and printed sources, which copy the Russian 
disinformation messages and anti-Western narratives.  
The pro-Russian media sources provide editorials, offered by the local experts, 
mostly renewed public figures, who ‘legitimize’ the Russian-backed narratives and 
undermine the pro-Western drive. Most of the media events in Georgia concentrate 
on past history, portraying Russia as a savior of Georgia from the Muslim yoke, 
position the Western cultural aspects as alien to the Georgian culture and identity, and 
condemn the European liberal idea as decadent, thus threatening the Georgian 
Orthodox-Christian values. Paradoxically, not only the Russian TV stations promote 
Moscow’s interests, but “the national media becomes influential actor in 
dissemination of the Kremlin’s narratives through their media content” (Detector 
Media, 2017, p. 8). In this turbulence, the pro-Russian forces, pretending to be the 
sole ‘pro-Georgian’ agents, find their niche in the political public sphere. The 
opponents of the pro-Western (dis)course, who portray Russia as a model of a strong 
state, driven by national interests and the Christian values, build their discourses on 
traditions and cultural-religious sentiments and create the environment where political 
relationships and alliances are more actively contested; withought providing any 
viable alternative to the pro-Western drive, they indirectly reinforce the “Northern 
vector,” avoiding to be mentioned as the pro-Russian political groups, which will 
damage their image of the neutral, pro-Georgian political forces – allied neither with 
the West, nor with the North.  
These actors present some issues – the Western enlargement in post-Soviet 
space vis–a-vis policy actions of the Orthodox Russia – as a “threat to the existence” 
of Georgia and for ensuring security, resolving territorial problems and securing 
prosperous development of the country either point to the need of neutrality of the 
country or the necessity of choice in favour of the lesser evil (the pro-Russian camp). 
Alternatively, firm adherents to the Euro-Atlantic aspiration (the pro-Western camp) 
present democratization and Western integration as a desirable direction for the 
successful preservation of Georgia’s statehood and its future democratic 
development. In this bifurcated space, the Russian disinformation policy is 
particularly successful in Georgia, where the Kremlin aims to discredit democratic 
values and institutions, as well as the pro-Western leaders, with the aim to change the 
pro-Western course of Georgia. The strategies of incursion in politics, media and civil 
society is tightly intertwined and in a way reinforce each other for manipulation of 
public opinion. Through these actions, the opportunity for the rise of populism and 
political isolationism is created in Georgia and the Kremlin will benefit from this for 
fulfilment of its political aims (Detector Media, 2017, pp. 7-8).  
The Russian Federation’s hybrid warfare relies on the disinformation narratives 
to undermine the the image of the West, hence normative foundaitons of democracy 
promotion in Georgia. Most of the Russian-made and disseminated messages are 
culturally embedded meaning-making structures through which identities are 
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understood and createed. Effective application of message enables to tap into an 
unconscious narrative and trigger an unconscious response through its structure and 
content. The narrative(s) triggers the identities of the target audiences both as victims 
and as potential hero’s (understood as martyr’s in some cases). Firstly, they provide 
the audience with a way of understanding their present situation (that they are victims, 
why they are victims and who they are victims of) and secondly, they describe a way 
out of victimhood, which is neither about telling the truth or telling a lie, but about 
just telling a narrative (DIN, 2018). The pro-Russian media in Georgia has been used 
to inject information in the public domain, which cause confusion and enable 
manipulation of political discourse” (See: Walker, 2017, 21).  
The strategies of Kremlin’s dis-information activities, which cause turbulence 
in politics, media and civil society, include the following measures:  
• Discrediting political elites;  
• ‘Containing democracy’ via building bridges with the leaders of illiberal or 
semi-authoritarian leaders, etc. (selected from opposition figures);  
• Disseminating fake news, which either questions or erodes credibility of the 
liberal democracy;  
• Sharpening divide and antagonizing mainstream political parties on the one 
hand and left- and right-wing parties on the other.  
 Pro-Russian forces have employed cultural-religious features, which form the 
core of the Georgian identity, in order to oppose the Western drive of the country. 
These groups appeal to the geopolitical aspects (a foreign policy tool of the Russian 
Federation) to justify their foreign policy choice/course in the eyes of the population. 
Arguing that Georgia cannot escape from its geographical location as a neighbour of 
the Russian Federation, they promote a shift to neutrality, i.e. balancing between the 
West and the Northern orbit. This bifurcation of political processes between various 
actors strengthens the moderate line at the expense of the pro-Western drive. It 
provides avenues for the emergence of the neutral (read pro-Russian) narratives, 
based on the argument of balancing Georgia’s foreign policy between Russia and the 
West, which undermines country’s pro-Western course and makes it more vulnerable 
to the Russian encroachment. 
 
Prospects of Democracy Promotion vs. Securitization of Foreign Policy  
The present section highlights interconnections between the foreign policy 
course and securitization discourses from the side of the pro-Western and pro-Russian 
actors of Georgia. The analysis deconstructs the policies of the presidents of Georgia 
since independence and highlights political and cultural aspects which are securitized 
by the pro-Western and pro-Russian actors in justification of their foreign policy lines. 
Mass-media creates fertile ground for securitization of foreign policy as through its 
power different aspects are brought to the forefront of public debates by politicians to 
win public support for particular foreign policy direction. The Copenhagen School of 
securitization theory claims that “any country’s policy line is shaped in or through 
securitizing discourse” (Buzan, 1998: 24) and explains internal and external 
constrains of a country’s foreign policy formation process and elites’ foreign policy 
choices, made under severe challenges posed to a country’s statehood and security. 
Stressing particular threats posed to a state or a nation is already an act of 
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securitization (Erikson and Noreen, 2002: 10). Securitizing actors are mainly political 
elites - leaders, lobbyists or governmental agencies (Buzan et al., 1998: 40), who 
create a discourse through a speech act – formulating particular topic in a way that 
draws attention of an audience and mobilizes masses in support of their judgments, 
thus legitimizing their desired policy line (Erikson and Noreen, 2002: 10). In Georgia, 
political actors present some issues – the Western enlargement in post-Soviet space 
vis–a-vis policy actions of the Orthodox Russia – as a “threat to the existence” of 
Georgia and for ensuring security, resolving territorial problems and securing 
prosperous development of the country, either point to the need of neutrality of the 
country or the necessity of choice in favour of the lesser evil (the pro-Russian camp) 
or argue for a firm adherence to the Euro-Atlantic aspiration (the pro-Western camp). 
The Western line is presented as a desirable direction for the successful preservation 
of Georgia’s statehood and its future democratic development.  
The Georgian-Russian relations have been securitized by each president of the 
independent Georgia, although their political experience, context of their emergence 
into the power and political aims, their domestic and foreign policy lines, have 
determined the mode of securitization and its outcomes. The policy of the first 
president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was strongly anti-Soviet/anti-Russian, thus there was 
little space for public expression of the pro-Russian voice from the side of political 
actors; nevertheless, inclinations towards the North at least on the level of sentiments, 
latently or openly, have been always around. During his short-lived presidency, 
Gamsakhurdia managed to initiate and the new electoral law was endorsed by the 
parliament, which prohibited registration of regionally based parties created on ethnic 
grounds: “a new electoral law barred them (Abkhazians) from voting Aidgilara in the 
Georgian Supreme Soviet elections in October 1990, because the organization 
represented separate territorial interests” (Jones, 1992b, p. 87); This move could be 
counted as a positive step towards the development of inclusive civic democratic 
culture in Georgia. Nevertheless, referring to ethnic-nationalist discourse, his rhetoric 
on the rights of Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia worsened the situation in 
the country and further exacerbated inter-ethnic relations. “Gamsakhurdia contributed 
to the emergence of chauvinist nationalism, whereas portrayed and considered 
himself a Georgian national hero. Naturally, this aggravated the national feelings 
among the ethnic minorities residing in Georgia” (Jones, 1992b), which had negative 
influence on the prospects of democracy in Georgian during the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the public speeches and appeals of Gamsakhurdia 
demonstrate that he was too cautious with respect to ethnic minorities compactly 
residing on the territory of Georgia, and the characterization of his personality as 
chauvinist and extremist, stems from reading various of his statements out of context. 
Although, some radical statements and out-of-context reading of his speeches did 
significantly contribute to the exacerbation of inter-ethnic strife at that time and 
undermined high hopes of democratization following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.2 The second president, Eduard Shevardnadze, tried to take the Russian 
 
2On the issue of Gamsakhurdia’s position towards minorities and his general attitude towards 
the Russian Federation, as well as for the differentiation of minorities of Georgia and the post-
Soviet actions of Russia, see “Appeal to the Population of Abkhazia,” in the newspaper 
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interests into account (Georgia became member of the CIS) and to balance this choice 
through the pro-Western projects (the Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline and the Baku-Supsa 
Oil Pipeline, military cooperation with the US, named as the GTEP – Georgian 
Trained and Equip Programme, running in 2002–2004). In 2004-2012, during Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s two consecutive terms of presidency, the country went through two 
stages of relations with Russia – an attempt of rapprochement and balancing it with 
the West, and full alienation from Russia, accompanied by an uncompromising 
rhetoric and policy-line towards the Euro-Atlantic structures (after the Russian-
Georgian August War of 2008 in particular). The early stages of Saakashvili’s tenure 
were marked by a period of reaching out to Moscow. In his 2004 inauguration speech 
he stressed the necessity of “good relations with Russia,” arguing that he was not a 
“pro-American or pro-Russian” but “pro-Georgian” leader (ISGP, 2007: 60-61), 
whereas after the August, 2008 his rhetoric was centred on the necessity of 
preservation of Georgia’s statehood vis-a-vis the Russian threat, which could be 
achieved only through the policy of approachment with the West through Euro-
Atlantic structures. 
The foreign policy of the Georgian Dream has become somewhat balanaced 
and the strong pro-Western and radically anti-Russian rhetoric of the President 
Saakashvili has been gradually substituted with a so-called “normalization policy” 
with Russia. Like the early stages of Saakashvili’s Presidency, the Georgian Dream 
government believed that it could achieve at least serviceable, pragmatic relations 
with Moscow (Cecire, 2013: 73). Its policy of normalization of relations with the 
Kremlin tries not to provoke Moscow, irrespective of hostile actions the latter takes 
against Georgia (Falkowski, 2016: 25) (e.g. continuous processes of borderization 
and creeping annexation just to mention one of Russia’s permanent irritant activities 
against Georgia). The Georgian Dream blamed Saakashvili’s government for its 
radical policy vis-à-vis Russia, which led to political crisis between the two states 
with the August War as its final stage. This view of the past is justified, and more to 
the point even endorsed by the population, considering the existing nostalgia for the 
Soviet past, although weak, still present in the Georgian society; Saakashvili’s more 
active pro-Western policies led to a kind of nativist anti-Western backlash that is not 
yet obvious in public opinion polls, but is conspicuous within elite opinion (Nodia, 
2013: 105).This is probably due to the fact that the pro-Western course still has 
popular backing, which is dominant in public discourse (Falkowski, 2016: 12).  
 
Sakhartvelos Respublika, #108, 25.05.1991;/“The President of the Republic of Georgia, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, Answers to the Questions of Journalists and Televiewers,” in the newspaper 
Sakhartvelos Respublika, #223-224 (244), 14.11.1991; “The Speech of the President of the 
Republic of Georgia at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia on June 
7, 1991,” in the Newspaper Sakhartvelos Respublika, #114 (134), 11.06.1991;/“The Speech of 
the Head of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia on March 5, 
1991,” in the newspaper Afkhazetis Khma, #42 (13408), 12.03.1991;/“Address to the 
Abkhazian People,” in the newspaper Afkhazetis Khma, #42 (13408), 12.03.1991;/“Address of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia to the Communists of Abkhazia 
and its Entire Society”, in the newspaper Sakhartvelos Respublika, #48 (68), 12.03.1991; “The 
Speech of Gamsakhurdia Delivered at the Rally in Tbilisi on December 25, 1989,” in the 
newspaper Sakhartvelos Respublika, #12, 20.12.1990. 
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The fracture between the security driven and cultural-religiously motivated 
foreign policy discourses of the country is apparent. The normalization policy tried to 
decouple political and economic relations with Russia (in pragmatic sense, void of 
any ideological affinities) and to revive ‘public diplomacy,’ cultural exchange and 
economic relations between Georgia and Russia for future political dialogue over the 
status related issues in respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The idea of ‘segmented 
engagement’ with Russia appeared in the public domain to balance the political-
ideologically driven pro-Western discourse and foreign policy of the country. The 
securitization discourse in Georgia, be it pro-Western or pro-Russian, could not be 
only pragmatic, but they need to be culturally reinforced in the eye of the 
population/electorate; in this respect, the religious commonality with Russia is the 
strong ideological element of the pro-Russian discourse in Georgia.  
 A gradual strengthening of the pro-Russian rhetoric at the expense of the pro-
Western one became apparent in increasing criticism of the West and sympathy with 
Russia on the part of some Georgian Dream coalition members, as well as through 
activation of the pro-Russian or Russian-backed mass-media outlets acting in Georgia 
(Obiekt TV, newspaper Asaval-Dasavali, radio Sputnik and range of other on-line and 
media information sources). The decrease of pro-Western rhetoric by the Georgian 
Dream activated some influential pro-Russian intellectual and political groups (the 
Soviet-era intelligentsia, first generation politicians of the post-Soviet independent 
Georgia and a young generation of pro-Russian and pro-Eurasian NGOs). Various 
statements of the Georgian Dream coalition’s former [and current de-facto] leader – 
Bidzina Ivanishvili – have created legitimate doubts whether his general pledge to 
continue pro-Western policies is genuine and/or thought through (Nodia, 2013: 105). 
This leaves space for those political forces which argue for the necessity of 
‘neutrality’ of Georgia in its foreign policy course, became frequent guests of political 
talk-shows and made their arguments in favor of Russia and against the EU/NATO 
direction (Gordadze, 2014: 58).   
Georgia’s policy towards Russia proves that the mechanism of public influence 
seems to reside primarily in the will of political leaders to embrace popular sentiment 
and to influence foreign policy decisions (Beasley and Snarr, 2013: 327). Public 
opinion could be defined as citizens’ attitudes towards particular foreign policy 
issue(s). The masses/society does not simply influence foreign policy, rather leaders 
try to lead society to opinions that are in line with their preferences, or ignore its 
opinion altogether (Kaarbo et al., 2013: 14). Margaret Herman and Thomas Preston 
argue that what they call ‘predominant leaders’ do count, especially in poorly 
functioning institutional environments like Georgia’s. Due to the limited political 
infrastructure and low-level of social and political organization in society, the 
influence of public opinion on Georgian foreign policy is weak; thus, Georgia’s elites 
obtained enormous autonomy in making Georgia’s foreign policy choices, 
particularly given the limited public awareness of external issues (Jones and 
Kakhishvili, 2013: 30, 36). However, public opinion can impose general constraints 
or impact foreign policy formation during election periods (Ibid, 2013: 28-30).  
In the Georgian public domain various values and cultural markers – normative 
aspects, customs and tradition, religion and historical records – are securitized by the 
pro-Western and pro-Russian political and societal actors, which determines the 
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dualistic discourses on Russia: the long-established image, Russia as the saviour, 
builds on religious commonality and on the redemption of Georgia from the Muslim 
yoke in the 19th century, thus preserving the main feature of the Georgian identity – 
the Orthodox religion – with the help of Russia. On this backdrop, the pro-Russian 
groups concentrate on religious commonality with Russia, seeing Russia as the sole 
direction of Georgia’s alliance and friendship and are in favour of the balanced 
politics between Russia and the West for restoration of country’s territorial integrity. 
The Georgian and European cultural features, primarily religion, together with 
numerous everyday practices of culture, are represented as mutually inconsistent and 
rapprochement to the West is considered as a precondition for the demise of Georgian 
culture and the Georgian nation (Thomas, 2016). These features are manipulated by 
the agents of the Russian influence, alongside their ultranationalist and extremist 
policy-lines (Detector Media, 2017, pp. 8-9), which undermines the prospect of 
liberalism and the liberal democracy in Georgia. Alternatively, the anti-Russian/pro-
Western actors (representatives of political and cultural elites) promote the image of 
Russia as an eternal enemy of Georgia, highlighting the negative past experience of 
Georgia’s annexation during the Tsarist and Soviet Russia, which led to the loss of 
statehood and nationhood in the 19th century, and the 200 years-long Russian 
colonization, characterized with the Russification attempts and Soviet-era purges of 
country’s political and cultural elites. The anti-Russian rhetoric is based on the 
Russian occupation of the Georgian territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) after the 
August War of 2008 and promotes the counter narrative, constructed across the shared 
cultural values with Europe and mythology of Georgians as an ancient European 
nation, disseminated through symbolisms of mental revolution and re-joining the 
European family of nations. This political narrative claims that without alternative to 
the Northern vector, which is the pro-Western drive of Georgia, the restoration of 
territorial integrity and provision of national security will not be ensured. 
The juxtaposition of the messages disseminated by the pro-Western and pro-
Russian actors points to the severe fragmentation of the political public sphere in 
Georgia, which undermines the process of democratization in the country. The main 
messages which undermine the Western conception of liberal democracy significantly 
hamper the process of democratization and compromises it vis-à-vis the rightist or 
leftist narratives of different kind. Mainly these narratives are anti-liberal and justified 
on the bases of the orthodox religion, to which Russia is the leader and the main 
defender of the orthodox civilization; hence Georgia’s foreign policy should prioritize 
its relations with the Russian Federation.  
 
Internal Challenges to Democracy 
The current section will break-down the Georgian societal space into those 
fields in which the soft-power intervention of Russia via disinformation is the most 
successful in terms of fragmentation of political public sphere. These sectors are the 
main pillars of democracy, hence the process of democratization of Georgia becomes 
endangered. To this end, Russia intervenes in the sphere of politics through targeting 
party politics, and in media and civil society through creation of alternative agents, as 
it enables the Kremlin to disseminate alternative messages and contentious issues for 
adding challenges to the Georgian democracy and democratization process. In these 
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fields – politics, media and civil society – ‘varieties of publics’ are created for 
fragmentation of [political] public sphere via ultra-nationalist messages, propagation 
of Eurasia as an alternative power-pole of the EU and underlining religious similarity 
between Georgia and Russia. Through injecting myths regarding the West in the 
Georgian public domain the alternative image of the West, i.e. Russia is created, 
which will successfully contain challenges emanating from the West to the traditional 
Georgian culture and society, hence Georgia’s prospects of integration in the Western 
structures are compromised. 
The aspirations of the pro-Russian forces and reinforcement of the positive 
image of Russia are justified through the six myths, which denounce and undermine 
the image of the West in the Georgian [political] public sphere: Myth 1. The West 
fights against the Georgian Orthodox faith and culture-traditions; Myth 2. Russia is a 
source of economic development and welfare for the population of Georgia; Myth 3. 
The West supports the existing government, not Georgia; Myth 4. Russia could still 
protect us from our historical enemy – the Islamic World; Myth 5. The West will never 
accept Georgia as a member of the NATO and the EU; Myth 6. The EU and the US 
demand legalization of a same-sex marriage in Georgia (EI-LAT, 2016, pp. 43-46). 
These myths reinforce Russia’s actions across the civil-ethnic divide of the political 
public sphere of the country as they target various normative foundations of liberal 
democracy.  
Politics. The Georgian political landscape became fragmented due to the nature 
of the Georgian party politics, which is characterized by low popularity of parties, 
relatively low turnout, small party membership, weak partisan identities and weak 
grounding of parties in civil society. They are often characterized by top-down 
hierarchical structures in which the chairperson is the single most important figure 
(Kakachia, 2013, p. 47). Thus, the rhetoric and messages of a leader of particular party 
have the power to influence on population, direct public opinion and to fragment 
political public sphere (Detector Media, 2017, pp. 14-15). This problem was further 
complicated after the parliamentary elections of 2016, when the new political center 
– so called nationalist pro-Georgian force, the Alliance of Patriots – entered the 
parliament. The PMs from these political party voice the idea of launching multi-track 
dialogue with Russia – including with the members of Duma, MPs and influential 
experts and policy-makers in Russia and with their rhetoric resonate with and further 
reinforce the Russian disinformation messages. Meantime, the Georgian electorate is 
less interested in public debates on the ongoing pressing political issues of the country 
and as a rule makes its choice at the ballot-boxes, without critical reflection of the 
past and proper comprehension of the promised future; the fact that the population of 
Georgia is conjunctional, strongly influenced by the past legacies and future promises 
of political elites further sharpenes this problem and undermines the prospects of 
development of deliberative democracy. 
The “Eurasian Institute” and the “Eurasian Choice” are the main vehicles 
promoting the pro-Russian political discourse among the population of Georgia. The 
“Eurasian Institute” cooperates with the Russian organization “Lev Gumilev Center”, 
founded in Moscow in 2011 which popularizes the idea of Eurasianism as a source of 
resolution of ethnic conflicts and considers prospects of Georgia’s integration in the 
Eurasian Union (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 22-23), which is considered 
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as a profitable for country’s economy and a step ahead towards normalization of 
relations with Russia and resolution of the territorial conflicts of Georgia (Detector 
Media, 2017, p. 8). Its leader, Archi Chkhoidze, frequently underlines the fraternity 
between the Georgian and Russian peoples based on the Orthodox faith, and 
entertains contacts with Russia’s main proponent of Eurasianism, Alexander Dugin, 
as well as with Russian political figures like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady 
Ziuganov, and is frequently cited in Russian media (Nilsson, 2018: 40-41). Chkoidze 
claims that “calling Russia occupant is a high treason,” as during the talks behind-
the-scenes, the Russian politicians and experts stated that if Georgia changes its 
foreign direction and renews strategic partnership with Russia, Moscow will support 
Georgia in resolution of its conflicts. In April 2014, he even promoted the idea of 
launching referendum which would determine whether the population of Georgia opt 
for the West or for Russia (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 38-39). These 
sort of political messages plant false hopes in the hearts of the portion of the Georgian 
society, which reinforces division between the pro-Western and pro-Russian camps. 
These ideas resonated with the conservative ideology of Moscow and coupled with 
disinformation policy, reinforce the economic and culturally driven narratives of the 
pro-Russian forces, which resonate with the opinion of the segment of population (see 
below) and undermine the pro-Western one. The pro-Russian forces promote the idea 
that Russia is irritated due to Georgia’s rapprochement with the West and refer to the 
Russian political actors in Moscow, who express their deadiness to turn to the ‘politics 
of normal’ with Georgia (Detector Media, 2017, p. 8). These messages in different 
forms were constantly voiced in the Parliament of Georgia between 2016-2020 by the 
political party „Alliance of Patriots of Georgia “, referred as the pro-Russian political 
party by the pro-Western political forces and portion of the society, self-designated 
and pretending to be the sole pro-Georgian political party. Interestingly, it has been 
allied with the far-right groups of Georgia during their street-protest and 
demonstrations.  
Media. The Georgian media has become increasingly fragmented and the 
consistent governmental policy or action framework for the containment and 
combatting the Russian disinformation have not been elaborated yet. Quite the 
contrary, in 2015-2017, the government of Georgia, for dissemination of information, 
contracted those media outlets and platforms which were notorious for their 
homophobic and anti-Western propaganda and even pursued the pro-Kremlin 
editorial policies (Detector Media, 2017, p. 16). Thus, the national media (the Public 
Broadcasting and number of pro-Russian media outlets) became the main vehicle for 
dissemination of the Kremlin’s narratives. The media narratives strive to correct 
purposefully fabricated and falsified information regarding the Russian-Georgian 
relations and assist the young generation of Georgians to become familiarized with 
the real historical past of their country (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, p. 11). 
The main messages argue that Georgians need to make a clear choice between flirting 
with the West or maintaining its historical values and identity. Thus, promoting the 
idea of launching the balanced politics between the West and Russia and arguing for 




The media sources, promoting the pro-Russian messages, are mainly 
established and run by the above-mentioned NGOs or CSOs: the news agency 
“Sakhinformi” was the media platform of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian 
SSR and after the declaration of independence, between 1993-2004, it became under 
direct subordination of the president of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze; it was 
abolished after the Rose Revolution, but in 2010 the news agency was re-established 
by its former journalists under the same name. Together with its media-partner “The 
Obiekht-TV,” it became the main locomotive of the anti-Western and homophobic 
ideas. The anti-Western propaganda is disseminated by the Sakinform.ge , together 
with the web-portal Geoworld.ge, which are founded by the NGO “Historical 
Legacy” with the aim to reach out the wider audience. The organization strives to 
correct purposefully fabricated and falsified information regarding the Russian-
Georgian relations and assists the young generation of Georgians to become 
familiarized with the real historical past of their country (Dzvelishvili and 
Kupreishvili, 2015, p. 11). The web-portal Geoworld.ge partners with Modest 
Korolev, who is the founder and editor of the Rex.ru and Regnum.ru and is the main 
ideologist of Russia’s relations with the CIS countries. He was also responsible for 
avoiding further dissemination of the ‘velvet revolutions’, which brought peaceful 
change of governments in Georgia and Ukraine (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, 
pp. 16-17). The Geo-World.ge partners with the media platform “Iverioni,” founded 
in 2012, which mainly disseminates anti-Turkish, anti-Western and pro-Russian 
narratives. One of its editorial posts, titled as “Imperial Russia, or the West heading 
towards LGBT?!” argues that Georgians need to make a clear choice between flirting 
with the West or maintaining its historical values and identity. It promotes the idea of 
launching the balanced politics between the West and Russia and suggests to consider 
mentality during making allies (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 20-21). 
The pro-Russian and anti-Western sentiments are spread by the broadcasting 
company - the “Patriot TV,” established by the “Eurasian Choice” and the “Society 
of the King Erekle II.” The message-box of the TV station includes, but is not 
restricted to the need of preservation of Georgian traditions and culture, propagating 
negative influences of the EU norms and regulations on economy of the Eastern 
European countries after they joined the union; it frequently associates the West, and 
particularly Europe, with gay rights, and claims that Georgia’s economy can be 
competitive only by integration with the “Eurasian” market; this creates negative 
scenarios of the future cooperation between Georgia and the EU. Another TV Station 
“Dro,” established in 2014, popularizes less famous faces of the Georgian public 
space through its programs – “Language, Motherland, Religion,” “Time of Dialogue” 
and “Time of Solidarity,” which appellate on cultural and traditional aspects, being 
sensitive for Georgians. The multi-media project “Sputnik”, the foreign service of the 
Russian state news agency “Ria Novosti” and the radio station “Russian Voice” 
launched the “Sputnik Georgia” (January, 2015), running on-line portal and radio 
station simultaneously. The National Communication Commission of Georgia did not 
give license to the Radio “Sputnik” to operate in Georgia, thus it now runs a news 




Civil Society. The civil society actors create communication platforms through 
intellectual circles, which legitimize and further disseminate the pro-Kremlin 
narratives (Detector Media, 2017, p. 8). They undermine the pro-Western discourse 
through the patriotic slogans and lexicon, based on identity and values issues. They 
breed fear that integration in the Western structures and acceptance of the Western 
values would undermine national identity, religious practice and sexual identity; 
therefore, the anti-Western narrative mainly relies on the idea of defence of dignity 
(Detector Media, 2017, pp. 17-18). In civil society the Russian supported 
organizations are mainly centered on humanitarian activities and promote the idea to 
prohibit CSOs which are funded from foreign donors. This message is identical to the 
message included in “The Russian Federation’s State Security Strategy of 2015,” 
depicting these organizations as threats to the state security and portrayed against the 
traditional spiritual values (Detector Media, 2017, pp. 20-22). 
The anti-NATO slogans and arguments are disseminated by the Eurasian 
Institute of Georgia, established by the young generation and graduates of the HEIs 
of Georgia, running various societal platforms: “The Club of Young Politologists;” 
“The Center for Problems of Globalization;” “The Caucasian Cooperation;” “The 
Center for the Study of the Problems of Globalization” and “The Center for Global 
Studies.” The Eurasian Institute prepared a review paper “Georgia-NATO – Myths 
and Reality,” which provided the negative image of NATO. The organization is 
blamed for its aspirtions to create its military bases in the South Caucasus for 
balancing Russian on the Black Sea coast, whereas remains neutral towards the issue 
of territorial integrity of Georgia; it needs Georgia for cheap soldiers for its peace-
keeping missions and does not provide security reassurance. Although it is argued 
that NATO could be a good balancer for Georgia vis-a-vis Russia, due to NATO’s 
actions in Kosovo, it is proclainmed as a non-trusted partner in restoration of 
territorial integrity of Georgia (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 30-31). They 
argue that there is a mismatch between NATO’s aspirations in the region (primarily 
centered on democracy promotion) and expectations of the Georgian authorities 
(NATO as a security guarantee vis-à-vis Russia for Georgia), which reinforces the 
claim that without normalization of politics and dialogue with Russia there could not 
be any breakthrough in terms of resolution of Georgia’s primary concerns – national 
security and re-gaining territorial integrity. 
The “Eurasian Institute” mainly carries out analytical activities and organizes 
conferences and round tables. Together with the “Society of Erekle II” it cooperates 
with the “International Eurasian Movement” and provide free of charge Russian 
language courses with the support of the “Ruskii Mir” throughout the entire post-
Soviet space (Lutsevych, 2016, p. 9) and classes in the Russian literature and in the 
history of the Russian state (Nilsson, 2018: 40-41). “The Eurasian Institute” initiated 
a project The Popular Movement for the Georgian-Russian Dialogue and 
Cooperation, which  contributes to the improvement of the Russian-Georgian 
relations, being artificially worsened by the forces acting within the country, as well 
as beyond its borders. The organization, through its expert interviews and comments 
in the media, provided positive assessment regarding Bidzina Ivanishvili and his 
political party, the Georgian Dream before the parliamentary elections of 2012, thus 
15 
 
reinforcing expectations of the normalization and improvement of the Russian-
Georgian relations (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 6-7).  
 The “Society of the King Erekle II” uses statements of clerics in its anti-
Western propaganda and argues that the foreign policy of Georgia should be directed 
according to the Orthodox religion, shared by Georgia and Russia and denounces the 
Western-funded NGOs, which are hostile towards Georgia and undermine the 
interests of the country” (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 41-42). Its efforts 
are reinforced by the CSO – “Scientific Society of Caucasiologists,” founded in 2010, 
which contributes to sharing knowledge and experience among scientists of the 
Caucasus for the improvement of relations between the people residing in the Russian 
Federation and other CIS member countries. In September 2014 the society organized 
a round table on the topic: “The Russian-Abkhazian Relations: The New Dimensions 
and Contours of Integration” (Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, pp. 23-25) to re-
build the positive image of Russia as a chance of conflict settlement in Georgia. The 
“Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy”, created under the decree of the 
president of Russian Federation, Dimitri Medvedev, established the “Russian-
Georgian Societal Center,” which promotes the idea of non-alignment of Georgia in 
foreign policy as a chance of normalization of relations with Russia (Lutsevych, 2016, 
p. 23). Its narratives are shared with the Russian officials, who claim that the Euro-
Atlantic integration is a device to drain natural resources of the post-Soviet countries 
and lure their states into the NATO, in order to replenish its human resources to fight 
the US-incited wars globally (Lutsevych, 2016, pp. 12-13).  
The religious aspect is also strongly manipulated by the pro-Russian CSOs. In 
2010, the new organization “Popular Orthodox Movement” was established, which 
promoted the idea of building the Georgian state, based on the orthodox values, 
ensuring development of the Georgian identity and traditional Christian mode of life. 
It also expresses its readiness to cooperate with the Patriarchate of Georgia and shares 
with it the idea of restoration of the monarchy as the mode of state order in Georgia 
(Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, 2015, p. 32). The role of Christianity in strengthening 
Georgia’s affiliation with the Western, Christian world is rather ambiguous. The 
Georgian Orthodox Church has exerted influence on political elites and their foreign 
policy choice to different degrees at various times, although its impact on foreign 
policy can be best described as marginal (Jones and Kakhishvili, 2013: 22). The 
problem is that it is hard to differentiate whether the Georgian Orthodox Church’s 
sympathies that coincide with Russian positions are product of the Russian soft power 
or stem from the ideological convergence of two the kindred churches. 
The challenges to the process of democratization in Georgia in the fields of 
politics, media and civil society contribute to the fragmentation of the political public 
sphere which undermine the process of democratization in the realm of politics from 
the radical voices of the left or the right, whereas in the fields of media and civil 
society through propagating the anti-liberal messages, presented in conformity with 
the Georgian traditions and orthodox religion and against the liberal democratic 






Propaganda: Messages Disseminated & Challenges Unveiled 
The current section analysis the main messages which are widely distributed 
by the pro-Russian media outlets and CSOs in Georgia. The Russian funded or pro-
Russian media, NGOs and CSOs promote ultra-nationalist and extremist policy lines 
and through coordination of their activities and message-box reinforce the pro-
Russian discourse. Their activities are not institutionalized, rather various individuals 
from these organizations disseminate the pro-Kremlin narratives (Detector Media, 
2017, p. 8). Their number is not significant in Georgia; most of them are registered 
by one and the same person and their content is created by the same editorial team; 
nevertheless, the frequency of their messages significantly influence the [political] 
public sphere of the country. They mainly disseminate culturally driven narratives 
and try to create an alternative version of historical past for bifurcation of the portion 
of Georgian society between the West and Russia. These sort of messages are 
promoting the image of Moscow as a defender and guard of the old European values 
– Christianity, family, state, nationalism and sovereignty – factors widely supported 
and valued by European citizens, but quite often side-lined and downgraded by 
European leaders in their rhetoric, thus pushed to the backstage of policy-making 
(Karaganov, 2014, p. 13). With these narratives, the Kremlin indirectly interferes in 
the opinion making process in Georgia, where the perception of shared “cultural-
religious” aspects between Russia and Georgia play a leading role in societal life of 
the country, which successfully undermines the normative power of the West, hence 
foundations of the liberal democracy, in the county. 
A cornerstone of the Russian influence operations is false and misleading 
information disseminated through various channels intended to deceive, divide and 
erode adversarial resistance to their aggression as some well-constructed narratives 
deliver meaning to a series of issues and events so that audiences don’t sort the 
meaning out on their own. Russian Federation’s operational narratives, or a 
comprehensive narrative strategy is a complete package of both offensive and 
defensive narratives coordinated to both degrade adversarial audiences and to build 
resilience within friendly audiences (Cobaugh, 2018). The Russian Federation 
successfully applies narratives, which promotes and exploites divisive topics. The 
influence of narrative strategies could be detected through the narrative identity 
analysis, which uncovers the impact of the Russian disinformation strategy on the 
local communities of grievances and highlights collisions over political orientation 
and cultural-religious dimensions. 
 The pro-Russian groups promote the idea of orthodox unity, seeing Russia in a 
leading position, as the sole direction of Georgia’s alliance and friendship and the key 
to the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity. Presenting the Georgian and 
European cultural features as mutually inconsistent, approachment to the West is 
considered as a precondition of the demise of Georgian culture and Georgian nation 
(Thomas, 2016). According to the Russo-Georgian advocates, Eurasia is a rising 
region that is not confined to Russia alone, while Georgia’s European choice is 
nothing more than a utopian “bright future.” Russia actually needs a pro-Georgian 
(as opposed to pro-Western) elite in Tbilisi, driven by Georgian interests and ready to 
cooperate with the Eurasian Union or serve as a bridge between Russia and the EU 
(Makarychev, 2016: 4).  
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 The government of Georgia manipulates existing threats stemming from Russia 
and tries to launch a neutral politics, although through these actions it reinforces an 
anti-Western rhetoric in the country (Detector Media, 2017, p. 8). This tendency 
enables the Russian Federation to maintain the satellite states in the post-Soviet space 
as a kind of a buffer zone. With this aim, through its disinformation campaign Russia 
works in Georgia with various political parties, media platforms and portion of priests 
from the Georgian Orthodox Church which inhibit ethnonationalist and illiberal 
discourses (Detector Media, 2017, p. 17). This has gradually increased the level of 
the Russian (dis)information influence and undermined public debate, the cornerstone 
of deliberative democracy in the public sphere of country. 
The Russian media might not be a reliable source of information, although 
narratives disseminated by it are familiar and popular among the wider society 
(Detector Media, p. 19). The Russian-backed media platforms:  
• In the sphere of politics plant nihilism in the society regarding the pro-
Western course of the country and bridge the issue of restoration of territorial integrity 
of Georgia with normalization of relations with the Russian Federation;  
• In the realm of culture, portray the traditional cultures, among them the 
Georgian culture, as endangered by the Western liberal conceptions (in this respect 
they are concentrating on the LGBT rights in particular);  
• In terms of economy, the visa liberalization and the market of the European 
Union is presented as non-realistic and undesirable option for the agricultural sector 
of Georgia due to its regulations; this idea is backed by the false narrative regarding 
the fall of economies of the Central and Eastern European countries after they joined 
the EU due to its normative regulations. Considering the nostalgia of the Soviet-time 
readily available Russian market for the Georgian agricultural and mineral products 
during the Soviet times and mainly until the Russian embargo of 2006 in particular, 
this message positively resonates among the portion of Georgian society (Detector 
Media, 2017, p. 14).  
These aspects also have their influence on the rural-urban divide on the issues 
of Europeanization and democratization as well. The existing ‘societal cleavages’ 
within the Georgian society which have been never overcome or mitigated by any 
government in office, complicates the process of formation of an unified political 
identity through solidifying core values, which, by default, reduces the threat of 
divisive narrative warfare. At present, deeply entrenched societal cleavages 
undermine and compromise democracy and democratization process in the country 
through deep fragmentation of the political public sphere. 
 
Conclusion  
Since the early 1990s, with the consolidation around the of order and stability 
after the bloody civil war and ethnic conflicts, followed by state disintegration, the 
civic idea was created and entrenched in the Georgia society. The civic idea of the 
Georgian nation-state - “who we are as a nation” is based on historical narrative 
reinforced through the myth of Georgians as an ancient European nation, aimed at 
bridging cultural and political aspects of the Georgian identity and ideas and ideals 
of its foreign policy course towards the West. “This sort of identity, once hardened, 
reduces the threat from weaponized and divisive narratives from Russia and other 
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aggressors” (Cobaugh, 2018), which are mainly constructed across ethno-religious 
aspects.  
The EU’s democracy promotion efforts have brought geopolitical implications 
in their wake, thus it should surprise no one if, in the absence of more robust Western 
engagement, Georgia gradually moves toward an increasingly non-aligned position 
between Russia and the West (Cornell, 2018, p. 254). The increasingly unpredictable, 
even volatile geopolitical situation, in which old patterns of alignment no longer apply 
(Cornell, 2018, p. 259) might undermine the approach of the EU towards the region 
through the concept of ‘resilience’, as resilience in the countries of the Eastern Europe 
(read the EaP – D.M.) is of a geopolitical nature and it makes the EU a geopolitical 
competitor of Russia in the shared neighborhood (Mikhelidze, 2018, p. 268).  
The EU needs to go through the policy transformation through rethinking not 
only in terms of differentiation its approach towards the EaP member countries, but 
also in linking the ideas and ideals, as well as its normative power-play, with security 
elements, tailored for the local grievances. A better understanding of the geopolitical 
importance of the South Caucasus to the wider region of the Eastern Europe/Middle 
East would increase each South Caucasus state’s importance vis-à-vis the EU, 
although this needs to comprehend the greatest single challenge to regional 
development and security, which is instrumentalized by the Kremlin’s 
interventionist approach (Kakachia et al, 2018, p. 15). 
The EU needs a dual strategy: structural reforms and transformative policies 
and provision of security guarantees and engagement in conflict resolution, as the 
relevance of the EaP for regional actors is directly linked to the EU’s ability to deliver 
on its commitments, especially regarding security and prosperity (Simao, 2018, pp. 
40-41). Considering the fact that for the South Caucasus countries fundamental issues 
linked to their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity has raised concerns 
regarding the ability of Western institutions to assure the security of smaller states 
(Simao, 2018, p. 39), the EU underestimated itself, failing to understand that its soft 
power actually did have a geopolitical dimension. The concept of strengthening social 
and economic resilience in the neighborhood is indeed a geopolitical idea (as was 
‘democracy promotion’) challenging Russia’s position in the shared neighborhood 
(Mikhelidze, 2018, p. 281). In addition, Euroscepticism has created a climate of 
uncertainty about the future of the EU, a climate that undermines the EU’s 
engagement and credibility in the Eastern Partnership region in general and in Georgia 
in particular. 
All the above-mentioned facts readily apply to the situation in and around 
Georgia. The general perception of the Russian disinformation influence by the 
Georgian society remains at a relatively low point, as there is no public consensus on 
this issue. The cultural-religious tools are particularly successful in Georgia to 
fragment the attitudes of the Georgian society towards the EU/West and Russia; most 
of the disinformation messages cause confusion regarding imminent threats stemming 
from the Kremlin’s incursion in Georgia and undermine the normative driven agenda 
of the EU, hence democracy promotion project of the West in the country. Under the 
fragmented political public sphere there is a danger of divergence from the pro-
Western line either to the idea of neutrality (likelihood is high) or to the pro-Russian 
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foreign policy course (likelihood is relatively low) as the membership in EU and 




• The fracture between the security driven and cultural-religiously motivated 
foreign policy discourses of the country is apparent. Thus, the EU should support 
those projects which deconstruct propaganda, which undermines liberal-
democratic project in Georgia, and should reiterate its calls to strengthen its 
capacity to counter misinformation and propaganda campaigns through 
reinvigoration of democratic credentials. 
 
• The securitization discourse in Georgia, be it pro-Western or pro-Russian, could 
not be only pragmatic, but they need to be culturally reinforced in the eye of the 
population/electorate; in this respect, the religious commonality with Russia is the 
strong ideological element of the pro-Russian discourse in Georgia which should 
be countered with effective delivery of the democracy and its social benefits in the 
Georgian society.  
 
• As the Russian information incursion in the Georgian public sphere through media 
endangers country’s security, the Georgian government needs to form a 
consolidated policy towards it which will mitigate the dangers of the anti-Western 
narratives disseminated through the pro-Russian media outlets and will contain 
internal rise of illiberal and populist tendencies. 
 
• Containing the Russian propaganda with alternative narratives and reinvigorating 
the image of the West, which is damaged by the Russian disinformation, could 
avoid further fragmentation of the [political] public sphere;  
 
• Latent threats, stemming from Russia should be neutralized via consolidation 
around the governmental supported pro-Western narrative and democracy 
promotion action (in the fields of politics, culture and civil society) which will be 
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